Abstract. Linkable ring signatures can simultaneously provide the properties of anonymity, spontaneity as well as linkability. Linear feedback shift register (LFSR) sequence can be used to shorten the representation of elements in a field. This paper proposes an LFSR-based linkable ring signature scheme, whose main computation operations are performed in base field GF (q) whereas security properties are under the state based discrete logarithm assumption(S-DLA)(and a new state based computational assumption weaker than state based decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption). The latter potentially says that the scheme is secure in the extension field GF (q d )(d the stage of the LFSR). All these make our scheme a flexible primitive for ubiquitous computing in which information processing has been thoroughly integrated into everyday objects and activities.
Introduction
For many practical applications or resource-limited environments, it is often desirable to speed up the cryptosystems without notable security degradation. Recently, several cryptosystems have been proposed to shorten the representation of the elements in the finite field [3, 7, 11, 13] by representing them with the coefficients of their minimal polynomials. For instance, Niederreiter [11] designed encryption and key agreement schemes based on general n-th order linear feedback shift register (LFSR) sequences. Giuliani and Gong [3] proposed a general class of LFSR-based key agreement and signature schemes based on n-th order characteristic sequences. Main contributions in these work are that they do not require as much bandwidth as their counterparts based on finite fields.
Ring signature attracts significant attention since its invention [1, 12, 15, 16] . In a ring signature scheme, a user first selects a set U (called a ring) of possible signers including himself, then signs a message using his private key and the public keys of all the members in the ring. The resulting signature can be verified to be generated by some user in the ring, but the identity of the actual signer will not be revealed, hence the signature provides the signer the property of anonymity which cannot be revoked. Linkable ring signatures have a specific property of linkability which means that any one can tell if two ring signatures are generated by using the same private key. In other words, linkability says two signatures by the same actual signer can be identified as such, but the signer remains anonymous. The first linkable ring signature scheme was proposed by Liu et.al. [10] . The property of linkability is really essential in some scenarios as explained below: (1) Suppose there is an organization that wants to conduct an anonymous and voluntary questionnaires among its members. It is demanded that only legitimate members can submit the questionnaires, and at the same time, each member cannot submit more than one questionnaire. Conventional ring signatures can ensure those who submitted the questionnaires are members of the organization and maintain users' anonymity, but they cannot prevent a member from submitting more than one questionnaire. (2) Another practical instance is to detect double-voting in an e-voting system. Although blind signatures or other cryptographic protocols seem to be able to achieve this goal, yet they require all the users to participate in the setup stage even they do not intend to join subsequent protocols.
In current work, we will construct a linkable ring signature scheme based on d-th characteristic sequences generated by an LFSR. Main computation operations of the scheme are performed in the base field GF (q). In fact, besides hash evaluations and addition/multiplications in Z P , only multiplications of elements in GF (q) are involved in our scheme. This particularly produces a fast system as no exponentiation in GF (q d ) is required. As for its security properties, by resorting to the random oracle methodology, we can show that it is secure under the state based discrete logarithm assumption and state based decisional product Diffie-Hellman assumption as defined in Section 2. Since state based discrete logarithm problem is proved to be equivalent to traditional DLP in GF (q d ) [3] , the proposed scheme successfully enhances the security of the system, at the same time, with low computational costs. In other words, to get a system equivalent to one based on extension field GF (q d ), there is no need to compute any exponentiation in GF (q d ).
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first introduce some conceptions and notations related to d-th characteristic sequences in Section 2, then give a security model of linkable ring signatures in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the new ring signature scheme based on d-th characteristic sequences. Its formal security arguments are described in Section 5. Finally, concluding remarks are made in Section 6. Notations. Throughout this paper, let Z P denote the set {0, 1, 2, · · · , P − 1}, and Z * P denote Z P \{0}. By ∈ R S, it means choosing a random element from the set S with a uniform distribution. For an algorithm A, we use x ← A to denote that A is executed on some specified input and its output is assigned to the variable x; if A is a probabilistic algorithm, we write x R ← A. Finally, throughout this paper, we often equate a user with his identity, his public key or his secret key without risks of confusion according to the context. Negligible Function. We say a function f : N → R is negligible if for every constant c ≥ 0, there exists an integer k c such that f (k) < k −c for all k > k c .
Preliminaries

LFSR sequences
We briefly review the necessary about linear feedback shift register. Let q be a prime or a power of prime,
If an initial state of s is given by
It is well-known that the period of the d-th characteristic sequence s is equal to the order P of α. Thus we can define s j = s P +j for all j ≤ 0, and further consider the sequence {s j } with indices running over all integers. We denote the i-th state of the LFSR sequence ass i = (s i , s i+1 , . . . , s i+d−1 ), and set A j = (s j , s 2j , . . . , s rj ), where r is defined by
Vector A j can be used to recover the minimal polynomial of [3] . Refer to [4] for more details about the theory of LFSR sequences.
Complexity problems
We start this part with several main sequence operations, i.e., SO1, SO2 and SO3, which will be repetitively employed in our scheme. Both SO1 and SO2 can be performed efficiently by the existing algorithms [3] , and SO3 can be viewed to be derived from SO1 and SO2 [8] . The following sequence operations can be jointly used to design smart and efficient cryptographic primitives, including our construction as depicted in Section 3.
-Sequence Operation 1(SO1): Given A j and an integer l(0 < j, l < P ), to compute A jl . -Sequence Operation 2(SO2): Given statess j ands l (0 < j, l < P ), to computes j+l . -Sequence Operation 3(SO3): Givens j and an integer l(0 < j, l < P ), to computes jl .
We proceed to recall the definitions of state based discrete logarithm problem(S-DLP)( and state based decisional Diffie-Hellman problem(S-DDHP)) on which the securities of our scheme are based. 
where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by A.
We say that the (t, )-S-DDH assumption holds, if no t-time adversary A has advantage at least in solving the S-DDHP.
It is known that the state based discrete logarithm problem as defined above is computationally equivalent to the traditional DLP in GF (q d ) [14] , and that the complexity of breaking S-DDH assumption is equivalent to that of solving decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in the field GF (q d ) [3] . Generally speaking, computational problems such as the DLP are much harder than the DDH, i.e., DDH ≤ DLP [6] . Analogical claims come into existence in the state based scenarios [3, 14] . In the following, we further introduce a new problem called state based decisional product Diffie-Hellman (S-DPDH) problem. Resorting to the new problem(and S-DLP), we can present our linkable ring signature scheme and construct formal security arguments for the scheme. 
S-DPDH assumption says that S-DPDH problem is hard to solve. More precisely, we say that the (t, )-S-DPDH assumption(S-DPDHA) holds, if no t-time adversary A has advantage at least in solving the S-DPDH problem.
One can easily note that S-DDHP is just an instance of S-DPDH problem(when we fixs a =s 1 ). In other words, S-DPDHA is no stronger than S-DDH assumption, which makes the problem S-DPDH independently interesting. It is believed that we prefer to build cryptographic systems on weaker assumptions. In fact, our construction is based on the two weak assumptions S-DLA and S-DPDHA which make the proposed scheme more flexible.
In this section, we will describe the definitions of linkable ring signatures (LRS) and of the security notions for LRS.
Linkable Ring Signatures
We first give an overview for the LRS model. On the one hand, as original ring signatures, LRS contains the system initialization algorithm Setup, user key generation algorithm KeyGen, signature generation algorithm Sign and signature verification algorithm Verify. On the other hand, LRS has a special algorithm called Link from which any verifier can decide whether two given ring signatures are generated by using the same secret key. 
Security Notions for Linkable Ring Signatures
Next we will formalize the security notions for LRS. To this end, we consider the following oracles which together model the abilities of an adversary against LRS:
-H(·): a random oracle is a theoretical black box that responds to every query with a (truly) random response chosen uniformly from its output domain, except that for any specific query, it responds the same way every time it receives that query. Put another way, a random oracle is a mathematical function mapping every possible query to a random response from its output domain.
-CO(·): a corruption oracle, upon receiving an identity ID i ∈ {0, 1} * , returns the corresponding secret key SK i ; -SO(·, ·): a signing oracle, taking as input a set of users L and a message m, outputs a signature of L;
For the security for LRS, there are three aspects we should consider: anonymity, unforgeability and linability. Let Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, Link) be an LRS scheme, n a polynomial and A an adversary attacking the property of anonymity for DGS. Our model takes insider attack into account by allowing the adversary to corrupt some fraction of the members and thereby come into possession of their secret keys. A runs in three stages.
In the find stage the adversary is given an initial information string I and the public keys of the members in the ring. It outputs two identities, say, ID 0 , ID 1 for uncorrupted members and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * . Based on a challenge bit b, one of the two identities is selected to yield a challenge signature on the message m, which is returned to the adversary, now in its guess stage. Finally A returns a bit d as its guess of the challenge bit b. In each stage the adversary will output state information that is returned to it in the next stage. We now provide a formal definition. 
Herein, we naturally require that A did not submit ID 0 , ID 1 to the corruption oracle CO(·). The advantage of the adversary is defined as
Let Π=(Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify) be an LRS scheme. We say that it is irrevocably anonymous if the function Adv IA A,Π (k) is negligible for any poly(k)-time adversary A and any polynomial n. Definition 6. Let Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify, Link) be an LRS scheme. For a PPT adversary A whose goal is to forge a ring signature, let n be a polynomial, consider the experiment:
Above, It is mandated that m * was not queried to the signing oracle. 
It is mandated that
LFSR-based Linkable Ring Signatures
Previously, linear feedback shift register(LFSR) is prevalently used to generate pseudo-random sequences which are essential in stream cipher [4] . In [5] , Gong and Harn studied 3-rd order LFSR sequences over a finite field whose cryptographic properties are employed to construct public-key distribution scheme and RSA-type encryption algorithm. Recently, Giulian and Gong [3] proposed an ElGamal-like LFSR-based signature scheme without formal security proof. Provable security is an important research area in cryptography. Cryptographic primitives or protocols without a rigorous proof cannot be regarded as secure in practice. There are many schemes that are originally thought as secure being successfully cryptanalyzed, which clearly indicates the need of formal security assurance. With provable security, we are confident in using cryptographic applications to replace the traditional way in physical world.
Current section is devoted to our LFSR-based linkable ring signature scheme LLRS. As will be seen from the scheme below, one of its advantages is that its securities rely on hard problems in extension field GF (q d ), while all computation operations are performed in base field GF (q). This potentially speeds up the run of the scheme without notable security degradation.
More concretely, our scheme LLRS consists of the following five algorithms where three sequence operations SO1, SO2, SO3 are repeatedly called.
Setup: given a security parameter 1 λ , the algorithm generates the appropriate system parameter as param = {q, d,s 1 , P, H} where H be a cryptographically secure hash function. KeyGen: a user with identity ID i randomly chooses his secret key (w i,1 , w i,2 ) ∈ Z * P 2 , and generates matching public key P K i = (s wi,1 ,s wi,2 ).
Sign: without loss of generality, we assume that user k is the actual signer. Let L = {P K i , i = 1, · · · , n} be the collection of all the public keys, and m be the message to be signed. Figure. 1. illustrates main compositions of algorithm Sign, and each box hits the high spots of each move in the algorithm. Due to space limitation, we omit the long-winded proofs which are similar to those in [17] according to the special structures of the schemes.
Conclusion
Linkable ring signatures can eliminate the registration phase in e-voting systems based on blind signatures and other protocols. From d-th characteristic sequences generated by an LFSR, the paper introduced a linkable ring signature scheme which can be supported by formal security arguments. The scheme enjoys the following attractive features: (i) the proposal provides an option for some applications (e.g. e-voting system, E-cash scheme); (ii) an independently interesting assumption(weaker than S-DDH) is introduced; (iii) main computation operations are performed in GF (q); and (iv) security properties of the schemes are equivalent to those of systems based on the multiplication group GF (q d ). The appealing features make our schemes more flexible and highly adaptable to practical applications in the sense that they enhance the security of the system and meanwhile maintain low computational costs as well.
In our scheme, the sizes of public keys and the resulting ring signatures are not ideal as desired. It would be very nice to find an LFSR-based signature scheme in which both the public key and the signature can be represented by short representations. Finally, it would also be nice to develop other applications dependent upon various state based problems.
